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Top Secret

SPECIAL ANALYSIS

USSR-POLAND: Soviet Concerns

After almost four months of martial law in Poland, the Soviets remain concerned over the slow progress toward rebuilding the Polish party and creating unions that will be both subservient to the party and able to attract workers. Although Moscow appears convinced that Premier Jaruzelski is for now the best available leader, it is using Warsaw's need for economic aid to prod him into reorienting Poland's economy toward the East.

The Soviets want the Polish military regime to expedite the reconstruction of the party into a more centralized and ideologically orthodox body, which Moscow views as an essential aspect of future civilian rule. During Jaruzelski's visit to Moscow early last month, Soviet officials reportedly chided him by comparing his military government to a Latin American junta.

The Soviets believe that a first step is the removal of party members too closely linked with reformist ideas and have publicly supported such a purge. Senior party officials from both countries appear to have focused upon this area during recent exchanges of visits.

Economic Leverage


Moscow is using Poland's need for Soviet economic aid-made more serious by Western sanctions-to influence Jaruzelski. During his visit, the Soviets reportedly agreed to increase their assistance. Moscow, however, apparently agreed only to the accelerated delivery of Soviet goods.

Moreover, the communique issued at the end of Jaruzelski's visit implies that Soviet aid will be conditioned upon the recrientation of Warsaw's economy more toward the East, on its taking steps to balance its trade with the USSR, and on its progress in stabilizing the political situation. The fundamental, long-term nature of these conditions suggests that negotiations will be protracted, and that disillusionment may grow on both sides.

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Fear of Worker Opposition

The Soviets are particularly concerned that Poland's labor movement not again become a rival to the party over the long term. Because of Solidarity's enduring popular support, Moscow is emphasizing that tight controls will have to be imposed over whatever trade union structure emerges.

President Brezhnev reportedly recommended to Jaruzelski that Poland establish a trade organization based upon the Soviet model, but the Polish leader refused to make such a commitment. The communique made no pretense of agreement on this issue.

The Soviets, nonetheless, recognize the importance of creating a union organization more representative of the workers than that which existed before the rise of Solidarity. They believe that such an organization is essential to increasing labor productivity and to removing the issue as a source of division in the party.

Some Soviets reportedly hope that the moderating influence of the Church can help pave the way for establishing new trade unions more acceptable to workers but still under firm party control. They appear to seriously underestimate the extent to which Jaruzelski would have to accept reformist ideas to reach a genuine reconciliation with labor.

Despite concern over Jaruzelski's slow movement on these issues, the Soviets appear convinced that no one else could maintain order as effectively while rebuilding the party and the unions. His elaborate welcome in Moscow is being repeated as he visits other East European capitals.